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This article could just as easily be titled The Theatre of Rhetoric. For the most part it is an exercise in 
synonyms. During the early twentieth century years, scholars of the emerging field of speech attempted to 
distinguish rhetorical from literary studies as they labored to justify themselves as separate academic 
departments. They built a field upon a set of antimonies, of the "rhetoric is to be heard, poetry overheard" kind. 
Such distinctions tend to waver and collapse toward a common center as soon as they are closely examined. 
There are, surely, rhetorics and poetics, formal differences between the sonnet and the docu-drama, the policy 
speech and the elegy, and these differences do affect the kinds of meanings that can prism through the forms. 
But beyond the surface differences, as soon as we attempt to adduce a set of generic distinctions, we find 
ourselves rediscovering instead the still largely uncharted forests of the human soul, glimpsed at those moments 
in our artistic communications with others and with ourselves, whether in forms typically regarded as poetic or 
rhetorical. 
This rediscovery, I have suggested, is wholesome, for to try to separate and classify the many products of 
human expressiveness can be to diminish them and the entirety they comprise. Such, I argue, was the fate of 
poetic stripped of its public function in the art-for-art's sake doctrine, and of rhetoric released from its ethical 
and esthetic obligation by the separation of the poet from the persuader. 
One summer many years ago, I spent two miserable and exhilarating weeks helping a long-time friend run for 
Congress in South Carolina. During those steamy June days, we would do battle with a dragon, the 
presumption commonly and accurately held that he was going to lose. We pumped indifferent hands, begged 
money from people who didn't like to make bad investments, and blitzed a somewhat hostile press with daily 
news releases proclaiming our significance. Late in the evening we would finally rest on his screened porch, 
listen to the night, and sip gin drinks. I remember that he talked often of Camus and of the absurdist element in 
our lives (a singularly appropriate theme) and of such matters as existential necessity. And from him, who was 
not schooled in the academic distinctions between rhetoric and poetic, I first heard-or first heard 
strikingly-the concept that the two arts may be finally inseparable. "I feel that I am an artist," he said, "and 
that this is all theatre." When I smiled at what I thought to be his metaphor, he 'said, quite earnestly, ''No, I 
mean really," and went on to talk about the players and the plot, and the different acts of the drama we were 
enacting. 
That moment was quite extraordinary for me, and the memory of it drifted back as I was writing this essay. 
What it announced in such a graphic context was what Staub, Bormann, and Kenneth Burke have since 
comfirmed for me. Staub called the rhetorician a "poet-plot-maker" who seeks to induce in his or her listeners 
the sense of critical choice and the necessity of commitment. 1 The speaker forces us to confront ourselves and 
the forces that impinge upon us. Bormann spoke of the fantasies in which we immerse ourselves, and which 
provide our motives and the promise of denouement. 2 And Burke has insisted of late that his dramatism is not a 
figure, for no actor can stand outside the play that provides his or her identity. 3 Where there is no tension 
between tenor and vehicle, there can be no metaphor, and illusion and reality become one together. 
Others have pushed along this growing consciousness of a significant unity among the arts of discourse. Rich 
rd Weaver has talked about a power structure submerged in language, sets of symbols indigenous to each 
culture which express its secret and public dreams and loathings. 4 To these "culturetypes," as I have called 
them, 5 I have added the notion of archetypal metaphor in rhetoric, of symbols in public persuasion which hold 
constant across cultures, and which join humanity in a certain ritual consciousness and a sense of enactment. 6 I 
don't intend here to call the role of the new scholarship in rhetoric, but what I wish to suggest is that the 
divergence of expressive forms, of the interpenetration of rhetoric and theatre. 
Wayne Booth has described the private and intimate bond between writer and reader in the successful 
communication of irony.' The reader is assumed to be superior to the characters described-the experience is 
distinctly elitist. Similarly, theatre places its audience in a position superior to the action it describes. Both in 
comedy and tragedy, that experience is distinctly Olympian-in Restoration comedy, for example, we are made 
superior for the esthetic moment to the fools who present to us the various forms of our own real or potential 
foolishness. Laughter becomes an act of transcendance. Similarly, in Greek tragedy we contemplate the 
transience and doom of our destiny in a moment that is lifted out of time and set upon a stage as upon a moving 
urn. We experience both the recognition of our fate and the rush of seeing our lives stretching out complete to 
their final horizons. 
In the sense of superiority given its audience lies a special power of theatre as rhetoric. Augmenting the kind 
of superiority Booth describes is the powerful reinforcer of group experience. Theatre can make us arrogant, and 
can confirm us in our arrogance. For Plato, the flattery potential of theatre as rhetoric must have been 
enormous. In the Gorgias he strikes out at the public message makers that gratify and exploit the people. 
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Clearly, however, the messages presented by that kind of communication called theatrical are given special 
urgency by the ego gratification provided within the form itself. We can be induced to assign such messages an 
importance and validity which they may not in themselves merit. 
Live theatre is limited as a mass medium by the usual size of its audience. Even with that limitation theatre 
can generate powerful rhetoric, and most revolutionary movements make use of it at vital moments in their 
coming to consciousness. Its power lies in its combination of two rhetorical advantages not normally found 
together: the immediacy of a live audience situation, in which the play addresses and is addressed by those who 
come to it, and the indirection of a fiction, which can make the audience especially vulnerable to its message. 
A live audience offers the opportunity for ritual participation in the action poised upon the stage. Fiction by 
its nature invites our vicarious participation, and so is fraught with rhetorical possibility. In role-playing we 
have a tendency to become that which we enact, and theatre can induce us into rehearsing roles rhetoric would 
provide for us in real life . After all, it's only make-believe! The risk seems low, the commitment asked from us 
only momentary and superficial. Why not, just for the moment, identify with these revolutionaries and their 
sentiments, so that we can share the excitement of their cause? Augmenting the possible rhetorical advantage of 
such vicarious participation is the unique possibility afforded by theatre for ritual participation, sharing such 
enactments with a group . Each theatre audience can be a collectivity waiting to be shaped into a rhetorical 
community, which shares values and a sense of mission. Ritual sharing, for beings who are imprinted by nature 
toward group experience, can be a powerful reinforcer toward the acceptance of the message in the action 
mimed upon the stage. 
To this unique advantage of theatre as rhetorical medium, add the consideration . that theatre deals with 
primary rhetorical functions. One of the worst distinctions ever entertained about the rhetorical and poetic arts 
is that the one deals with argument, the other with image . Images, as any mass media huckster would quickly 
inform us, are the very protoplasm of rhetoric. Rhetoricians strive to control us at the level of our perceptual 
encounters with self and the world about us. The images they offer predispose these encounters by creating 
certain anticipations. If we can be made to see subjects in the same or similar ways, our tendency will be to feel 
and act together as well, and harmonious feeling and action is the condition for any successful social existence. 
Therefore the impulse of a rhetorical community, for the sake of its own self-preservation, will be to create 
stereotyped or shared images which actually project, embody, and manifest its most important values. Thus we 
have images of the ideal citizen in peace and war, of the enemy without and w~thin, of sex roles that regulate the 
procreative impulse and harness it to the ends of social stability and continuity. Each social order will develop 
an entire vocabulary of such vital images, which it becomes the duty of any conservative rhetoric to preserve 
and protect. It follows that revolutionary rhetoric is best defined not by physical violence against the state, but 
by its iconoclastic intent. It aims to totter the sacred images that support social identity. Such images are the 
warrants, the major premises, that authorize public argument. To destroy them is to paralyze the other basic 
rhetorical functions of deliberation and judgment, and ultimately to destroy community. 
Theatre's role in performing such basic rhetorical functions can be obvious or delicate, and can range across 
the ideological spectrum. As in the work of Aeschylus, it can celebrate the polis and its civic virtues. Or as we 
discover in Sophocles it can raise questions about the conflict of civil law and divine imperatives, reminding us 
through the tragic example of Antigone that civic values may not be ultimate. The emergence of such questions 
can be the harbinger of revolutionary consciousness. Theatre's attack on the sacred images can be crude and 
direct, as it poses alternative images and enacts scenes which in effect dramatize arguments. Or the attack can be 
oblique, and by innuendo so subtle that the playwright might well claim innocence. When the facade of social 
order is contradicted by the internal writhings and agonizings of the characters revealed upon the stage, just as 
we see in Euripides' plays, we may leave the theatre with an afterimage of a society in trouble, ready for 
revolutionary events . As theatre affirms new and transcendant images rising from the ruins of a discredited 
social order, it invites us to join again in ritual celebration of community transformed around the new vision. 
·Revolution thus comes to us, not through the derivative modes of forensic or deliberative rhetoric, but rather 
through the epideictic mode, often theatrical, which as Aristotle noted, enacts the conflict of vice and virtue 
through the imagery of praise and blame. 
How does theatre persuade, beyond the presentation of pictures that are inherently arresting and potent with 
rhetorical meaning? Perhaps the least effective form of such rhetoric is didactic theatre that simply beats us 
about the head with its message. Such rhetoric places distance between us and the play, in that it makes us 
conscious of the play as persuader and of ourselves as the targets of persuasion. It may actually work against 
what is often the most effective rhetorical technique of theatre, the effect of drawing us disarmingly into the 
dramatic action for the vicarious role-playing experience. What we may often think is the most rhetorical theatre 
may actually be the leas t effective, either as theatre or as rhetoric . Certainly if the most effective art disguises 
itself, and this principle applies as well to the art of rhetoric, then such crude theatre can defeat itself by its own 
obviousness. 
A process of proving does go on in theatre, but it does not take the form of evidence adduced in support of 
propositions . The process has to do rather with the credibility of the images presented, what in artistic terms is 
called their verisimilitude. The images of life presented in theater must seem authentic: we must feel that they 
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articulate reality for us, bringing into clear focus what previously had been only vaguely realized. Such images 
must seem valid interpretations of our experience. If we are convinced of the authenticity of the images, then 
our tendency will be to carry our theatre experience over into actual life. For we shall be convinced that we have 
experienced-not some fiction-but rather a ritual that has carried us to the heart of reality, and which has 
illuminated life for us. 
If images are the very stuff of rhetoric, then argument can provide the drama of theatre. Indeed, theatre can 
present us with debate perfected, arguments that, released from the contraints and imperfections of immediate 
rhetorical situations, search into the very nature of being. I shall never forget how moved and stunned I was 
when first exposed to the argumentation in Marat-Sade: such moments are rare in a lifetime, and defy 
categorization either as esthetic or rhetorical experience. So argumentation is not necessarily rhetorical, just as 
imagery is not necessarily poetic: we may be convinced finally of nothing but the incredible magnitude of the 
human spirit in its capacity both for nobility and for cruelty. 
All such reflections drive me back to my thesis, that effective rhetoric and effective theatre are often 
interpenetrating and intertwining forms. Yet there is a sense in which theatre can indeed transcend our rhetorical 
selves. Theatre can function as meta-rhetoric, as a critique of rhetorical processes. A tired but compact example 
is Mark Anthony's speech in Julius Caesar, in which an effective rhetorical transaction is viewed ironically by an 
audience possessing superior knowledge. Meta-rhetorical plays may convey no social message beyond reminding 
us of the evanescence of rhetorical causes themselves. Beyond the purgation of strong feeling. theatre can offer 
us perspective on our time-bound, rhetoric-ridden existence. So relief from rhetoric, as well as powerfully 
effective rhetoric, can be the significant contribution of theatre. But in so far as relief from rhetoric renews us for 
rhetoric, theatre and rhetoric remain profoundly cooperative forms. And remembering how effectively Plato 
uses rhetoric in his attack upon rhetoric, we may seek a manipulative motive, even in the mask that takes the 
mask off rhetorical transactions. 
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